Abstract--This paper introduces new concepts for evaluation of the power system steady state operations, namely the Vulnerability Index (VI) and Margin Index (MI). They provide quantitative vulnerability and security margin information about generation, transmission, load conditions and then the whole system. System operators can assess the system security and vulnerability information using the margin and vulnerability indices. Therefore, they can take some preventive and emergency control steps to keep the system operating at the secure level.
I. INTRODUCTION
ne of the most challenging problems for current power system operators in the highly competitive electricity market and complex, aging and stressed power system infrastructure is that they do not know the system security conditions very precisely. They may operate their system in the insecure state due to system events which are much different from what was predicted in the planning and other off-line studies. When unexpected things happen, the operators lack enough security information and confidence to take timely preventive and emergency control steps to keep the system secure. Several large area blackouts illustrate this clearly. For example, in July 1987 the system operators of TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) just watched their system voltage decreasing while the load was increasing fast till voltage collapse occurred after they run off their reactive power supply [1] . In August 1996, the BPA operators did not know that their system was insecure after a key transmission line was disconnected following several line outages in the Western Interconnection System [2] [3] . The post-blackout simulations show that if appropriate load shedding had been taken at the load area of Idaho for 30 minutes, the July 1996 large area blackout could have been prevented [2] [4] . In August 2003 Northeastern blackout, the First Energy system operators did not know that they would run their system insecurely due to the next contingency. If the load shedding was taken at the Cleveland and Akron Area, the cascading outages could have been mitigated. With more system conditions awareness and associated control means taken, the catastrophic system loss could at least be mitigated if it could not be prevented [5] .
Several promising ideas for dealing with system security analysis were proposed [6] [7] [8] [9] . However, there is still a need for a technique that will give power system operators more precise information about the system operating conditions. Performance Index (PI) was first proposed to evaluate the line loading and voltage performance for the automatic contingency selection algorithm [6] . It is an important concept and method to evaluate system performance for contingency selection and security analysis. However, PI is not capable of representing the static security information for different system elements and the whole system in the dynamically evolving conditions. Besides the line overload and low/high bus voltage concerns, the loadbility, line distance relay performance, loss of generator and load, line outage, reactive power supply, etc., all need to be considered carefully. This paper presents a novel and comprehensive concept of Vulnerability Index (VI) as well as Margin Index (MI) to give precise vulnerability and margin information for individual system element and the whole system performance. At the generator level, vulnerability indices for real power output, reactive power output and generation loss and margin indices for real and reactive power outputs will be considered. At the bus level, vulnerability indices for bus voltage performance, loadability and load loss and margin indices for bus voltage performance and loadability will be presented. Islanding and isolated buses due to the line outages will be considered in the load loss part. At the transmission line level, vulnerability indices for line real power, reactive power, line charging, line bus voltage angle difference, line distance relay performance, and line-off influence will be discussed. Similarly, the margin indices for line flow, line bus voltage angle difference and line distance relay will be analyzed. Different weights of different elements will be considered based on their importance and power system operating practice.
This 
B. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index for buses
where, In this method, loadability is considered by using Thevenin equivalent impedance method [10] . There are other loadability analysis methods [11] which users can also choose based on their own decision. : individual line transmission limit, which can be either thermal limit or transfer limit due to security constraints 
C. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index for branches
For the apparent impedance seen by the line distance relay, if we use the series line model, we can find that normalized apparent impedance is only associated with the bus voltages along the line. 
For the more accurate Π line model, we can use accurate parameters to calculate the normalized apparent impedance. The smaller the normalized apparent impedance seen by the distance relay at no fault condition, the more possible the case that it may fall into the distance relay backup zone (zone 3 or zone 2 taken as backup). The smaller the apparent impedance, the more vulnerable the distance relay and the smaller the relay margin. 
This leads to the following conclusion: the larger the VI value, the more vulnerable the system condition.
From different VI and MI values for various system conditions, we can know more about the whole system vulnerability and security as well as the performance of individual system elements.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We use the standard IEEE 39-bus New England System to demonstrate our approach. The full AC power flow is run to get the steady state results, such as bus voltages, line flows and generator outputs. The detailed system data can be found at [12] . Fig. 1 gives the IEEE 39-bus system configuration. 
A. Vulnerability analysis for different loading conditions
We compare the vulnerability index (VI) values for the base load, 1.1 times the base load, and 1.2 times the base load with the generation increasing with the same ratio. From Tables I and II we can see that the system is more vulnerable with the load increasing. Generators need to generate more real and reactive power to supply the load, especially the reactive power output. Line loadings are heavier than before. Line charging ratio at the reactive power supply is decreasing since generators are supplying more reactive power. The bus voltage angle differences at lines are also increasing. Relays see apparent impedances smaller than before. For the bus voltage magnitude performance, the reason that Vulnerability Index values of 1.1 and 1.2 times the base load are smaller than that of the base load condition is that the bus voltage magnitudes are higher at the base load condition and they decrease with the load increase. We just give equal weights to all the parameters to give a simple example. In practice, system operators may assign different weights to represent the varying importance of selected elements in the system. Table III gives the margin indices of line distance relay and line flow. The top six most vulnerable lines are ranked by relay margin indices. They are much smaller than the average relay margin index 52.04. We can see that they are close to zone 3 circles even at the normal steady state. Thus, the distance relays at these lines need careful monitoring.
B. Vulnerability Analysis for Static N-1 contingency
We evaluate the system vulnerability by N-1 static contingency (line outage) analysis. For this small system, there are eleven single lines whose tripping result in islanding. They are L22(B19-16), L47(B20-19), and nine generator branches L37-L45 which connect G30-G38 respectively. For simple demonstration, here we only rank the non-islanding cases and give the Vulnerability Index values of the top six vulnerable line outages in Tables IV and V. We also check the relay margin and flow margin indices for those top six line outages. The top three most vulnerable relay margins and line flow margins of each line outage case are given in Table VI. Columns 2-6 of Table IV represent summary vulnerability indices of the system, buses and generators respectively. Columns 2-7 of Table V 
C. Vulnerability Analysis for Static N-2 contingency
We can also rank the system vulnerability by N-2 static contingency (2 line outages) analysis. For the 2-line outages, each of the single line combined with any other line can cause system islanding. There are also 30 pairs of lines whose outages can cause system islanding. For the simple demonstration, we only rank the non-islanding cases. Tables  VII and VIII 
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a novel and comprehensive concept of Vulnerability Index and Margin Index. Different security related factors are considered and modeled in this method, such as bus voltage magnitude, bus loadability, load loss, generator real and reactive power output, generation loss due to outage, line real and reactive power, line charging, bus voltage angle difference at the line, apparent impedance seen by distance relay, line outage, etc. Line charging, bus voltage angle difference, and relay performance are considered and modeled in this method. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index are combined together to give both the vulnerability and security information of the system and individual element. Thus, the system operators can evaluate their system operation quantitatively and know the vulnerability and security information of the system. The impacts on the system security by different system events can be analyzed and the system operators can take some preventive or emergency control steps to increase the security level. The full AC power flow method is used to calculate the Vulnerability Index and Margin Index values. 
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